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Emotion is conscious experience.  It is the affective aspect of 
consciousness.  Emotion arises from sensory stimulation and is 
typically accompanied by physiological and behavioral changes in 
the body.  Hence an emotion is a complex reaction pattern 
consisting of three components: a physiological component, a 
behavioral component, and an experiential (conscious) component.  
The reactions making up an emotion determine what the emotion 
will be recognized as.  Three processes are involved in 
generating an emotion: (1) identification of the emotional 
significance of a sensory stimulus, (2) production of an 
affective state (emotion), and (3) regulation of the affective 
state.  Two opposing systems in the brain (the reward and 
punishment systems) establish an affective value or valence 
(stimulus-reinforcement association) for sensory stimulation.  
This is process (1), the first step in the generation of an 
emotion.  Development of stimulus-reinforcement associations 
(affective valence) serves as the basis for emotion expression 
(process 2), conditioned emotion learning acquisition and 
expression, memory consolidation, reinforcement-expectations, 
decision-making, coping responses, and social behavior.  The 
amygdala is critical for the representation of stimulus-
reinforcement associations (both reward and punishment-based) 
for these functions.  Three distinct and separate architectural 
and functional areas of the prefrontal cortex (dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulate 
cortex) are involved in the regulation of emotion (process 3).  
The regulation of emotion by the prefrontal cortex consists of a 
positive feedback interaction between the prefrontal cortex and 
the inferior parietal cortex resulting in the nonlinear 
emergence of emotion.  This positive feedback and nonlinear 
emergence represents a type of working memory (focal attention) 
by which perception is reorganized and rerepresented, becoming 
explicit, functional, and conscious.  The explicit emotion 
states arising may be involved in the production of voluntary 
new or novel intentional (adaptive) behavior, especially social 
behavior.                  
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Emotions are self-generated internal explicit states, arise 
rapidly in recurrent systems, take time to form, have a 
prolonged duration, are seamless, structurally-complex, 
ineffable, transparent, bounded, unified and coherent, 
informative, serial, limited in capacity, subject to 
interference, new or novel, variable, flexible, project 
outwards, can gain access to other systems, and arise from 
attention.  All these properties of emotion have also been 
ascribed to conscious experience (Baars,1988;Koch,1998;Tononi & 
Edelman,1998).  Because emotion has all the same properties as 
conscious experience, emotion must be conscious experience 
(Liebnetz’s Law).  An emotion is defined as a conscious mental 
reaction subjectively experienced as strong feeling which is 
usually directed towards a specific object and is typically 
accompanied by physiological and behavioral changes in the body; 
emotion is the affective aspect of consciousness (Merriam-
Webster).  In other words, an emotion is defined as a conscious 
experience.  Emotion therefore is conscious per se.  Conscious 
experiences (including emotions) make up the content of 
consciousness (what is in consciousness).  The conscious 
experience aspect of emotion, apart from the bodily changes, is 
known as “affect” (Merriam-Webster) and an emotion may be 
referred to as an “affective state”.   
 
An emotion therefore has three components of variable intensity 
and prominence: a physiological component (various physiological 
reactions), a behavioral component (various behavioral 
reactions), and an experiential (subjective, feeling, conscious) 
component (LeDoux,1990).  Particular combinations of these 
reactions are recognized as particular kinds of emotion.  Fear, 
for example, may consist of increased sympathetic autonomic 
discharge, the release of stress hormones (adrenaline, 
cortisol), breakdown of energy reserves, increase in heart rate 
and respiratory rate, sweating, flight, cowering, freezing, 
fearful facial expression, fearful vocal expression, and 
subjective conscious experience of fear.  Other combinations of 
reactions may also be recognized as fear.  Happiness may consist 
of increased parasympathetic autonomic response, release of 
energy storage and conservation hormones (insulin, androgens, 
estrogens, oxytocin, growth hormone), storage of energy 
reserves, slowing of heart rate and respiration, receptive open 
approach behavior, smiling, happy facial expression, happy vocal 
expression, and subjective conscious experience of happiness.  
Similarly, other emotions are recognized as particular 
combinations of physiological, behavioral, and experiential 
reactions.  The reactions making up an emotion can vary in kind, 
number, intensity, and prominence.  Different emotions may share 
some of the same reactions.  Thus we have many varieties and 
degrees of fear, joy, anger, happiness, or other emotion.     
 
Emotions arise from sensory stimulation.  It is often difficult 
to connect emotions to the sensory stimulation from which they 
arise, as emotions are not inherent in or in any way part of the 
sensory stimulation itself (this is true of all conscious 
experiences).  Emotions are composed entirely by the person 
(they are subjective).  We may consciously experience sensory 
stimulation without emotion.  For example, we may consciously 
experience a rock or a pool of water without emotion.  However, 
anger or fear may become part of the conscious experience of the 
same rock (if it just hit us) or the same pool of water (if we 
had almost drowned in it).  We may also experience different 
emotions (fear, anger, love, hate, sympathy, etc.) to the same 
sensory stimulation (a specific person) at different times.  An 
affective aspect is added to conscious experience to produce 
emotion.               
 
THE AFFECTIVE ASPECT OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
   
It has been demonstrated by a number of investigators that there 
are two opposing systems in the brain for the development of an 
affective value or valence for sensory input (Gray,1991;Heath in 
1952,see MacLean,1969;Kissin,1986;LeDoux,1990;Murray et al,2009; 
Olds & Milner,1954;Paton et al,2005).  This affective valence 
has physiological, behavioral, and experiential components 
(LeDoux,1990).  LeDoux (1990) and Kissin (1986) found that 
affective valence for sensory stimulation is developed by fixed 
and plastic neural mechanisms that can facilitate or inhibit 
further stimulus processing at the brainstem, thalamic, and 
cortical levels.  The two systems are called the reward 
(pleasure, approach) and punishment (pain, avoidance) systems.  
Every emotion has an affective valence (it may be regarded as a 
positive or negative emotion) and appears to arise from 




Activation of the reward system has rewarding pleasurable 
facilitating approach effects.  The reward system of the brain 
follows the course of the medial forebrain bundle (Kissin,1986).  
It has been demonstrated through electrical stimulation of the 
olfactory bulbs, hippocampus, amygdala, cingulate cortex, 
substantia nigra, tegmentum, locus coeruleus, raphe nuclei, 
nucleus basalis of Meynert, caudate, putamen, lateral 
hypothalamus (had the greatest effect), thalamus, reticular 
formation, medial forebrain bundle, and orbitofrontal cortex 
(Best,2010;Kringelbach & Rolls,2004;Olds & Forbes,1981;Rang, 
2003;Volz et al,2008;Waraczynski & Stellar,1978).  The reward 
system is activated by rewarding conditioned and unconditioned 
stimuli, positive reinforcers, brief stimuli, low-intensity 
stimuli, and the cessation or absence of punishing stimuli or 
negative reinforcers (Gray,1991;Joseph,1990,2000;Kissin,1986).  
Base nuclei (ventral tegmentum, substantia nigra, nucleus 
basalis, locus coeruleus, raphe) which control four major 
neurotransmitter systems of the brain (dopamine, acetylcholine, 
noradrenaline, serotonin) are part of the reward system and 
mediate the effects of the system (Best,2010;Rang,2003).  
Activation of the reward system has arousal, alerting, 
facilitating, rewarding effects, which are also the effects 
obtained through activation of the above four neurotransmitter 
systems (Bakin & Weinberger,1996;Best,2010;Davis et al,1991; 
Frank et al,2004;Kapp et al,1990;LeDoux,1990;Rang,2003; 
Weinberger et al,1990).  There is evidence that variations in 
affective valence have a differential effect on mesocortical, 
mesolimbic, and nigrostriatal dopaminergic projections 
(Bertolucci-D’Angio et al,1990;Deutch & Roth,1990).  Deutch and 
Roth (1990) found that this depended on neuropeptide release.  
Gray (1991) and Maier (1991) found that acetylcholine, 
noradrenaline, serotonin, and opioid systems may also be 
influenced by affective valence.  The phasic burst firing of 
ventral tegmental dopamine neurons and the accompanying rise in 
dopamine release normally occurs in response to primary rewards 
and reward-predicting stimuli (Schultz,1997).  Diminished 
stimulation of mesolimbic dopamine release may result in the 
absence of behavioral incentive, apathy, and anhedonia (Drevets 
et al,1998).  Excessive stimulation of mesolimbic dopamine 
release may result in exaggerated hedonia response and elevated 
motivational drive (Drevets et al,1998).  Dopamine appears to 
modulate the reward value of stimuli.  The reward system is 
closely associated with the reticular activating system.  The 
reticular activating system essentially originates in the upper 
brainstem reticular core and projects through the intralaminar 
thalamic nuclei to the cerebral cortex to mediate arousal, 
attention, and consciousness, ie. the waking state (Evans,2003; 
Hannaman,2005;Kinomura et al,1996;Reiner,1995;Steriade,1995, 
1996;Young,2009).  Bilateral damage to the intralaminar thalamic 
nuclei produces lethargy or somnolence (Steriade,1996).  Damage 
to the reticular activating system results in coma (Daltrozzo et 
al,2009,2010;Liversedge & Hirsch,2010;Young,2009).  Partial 
destruction or inhibition of the reticular activating system 
results in a partial loss of consciousness known as acute 
confusion state or delirium (Rull,2011).  The reticular 
activating system and the cerebral cortex are necessary to 
maintain consciousness (Hannaman,2005;Young,2009).  The 
noradrenergic locus coeruleus, the mesencephalic reticular 
formation, the cholinergic nucleus basalis of Meynert, the 
dorsal hypothalamus, the intralaminar thalamic nuclei, and the 
tegmentum make up the reticular activating system (Afifi & 
Bergman,1986;Best,2010;Hannaman,2005;Kinomura et al,1996;Rang, 
2003;Steriade et al,1990;Thierry et al,1990;Vertes,1990).  The 
function of the reticular activating system is modulated by the 
adrenergic and cholinergic components (Burlet et al,2002;Evans, 
2003;Garcia-Rill,1997;Garcia-Rill et al,2007;Reiner,1995).  
Hence much of the reticular activating system is also part of 
the reward system and the two systems are activated together.  
Following damage to the lateral hypothalamus (the reward 
system), pleasurable sensation and emotional responsiveness were 
reduced (Olds & Forbes,1981) and faces became blank and without 
expression (Joseph,1990).  Unilateral lesions may produce 
neglect and indifference (loss of consciousness and emotion) to 
all contralateral sensory stimuli (Marshall & Teitelbaum,1974).  
Activation of the reward system has anabolic and restorative 
physiological effects, acts to facilitate further stimulus 
processing, stimulates attention and consciousness, generates 
positive emotion, produces approach behavior, and the individual 
works to prolong or maintain the rewarding stimulation (Gray, 
1991;Joseph,1990,2000;Kissin,1986).  Hence the reward system 
acts to produce the three components of positive affective 




Activation of the punishment system has punishing inhibiting 
avoidance negative effects.  The punishment, avoidance, or pain 
system consists of the entorhinal cortex-hippocampus-subiculum-
septal nucleus circuit, cingulate cortex, amygdala, medial 
hypothalamus, parasympathetic nervous system, reticular 
formation, periaqueductal gray (involved in pain transmission), 
thalamus, basal ganglia, parietal cortex, and frontal lobe 
(Afifi & Bergman,1986;Ganong,1988;Gray,1991;Joseph,1990,2000; 
Kissin,1986;Kringelbach & Rolls,2004;Volz et al,2008).  The 
punishment system is activated by punishing conditioned or 
unconditioned stimuli, negative reinforcers, long-duration 
stimuli, high-intensity stimuli, painful stimuli, and the 
cessation or absence of rewarding stimuli and positive 
reinforcers (Gray,1991;Joseph,1990,2000;Kissin,1986).  The 
punishment system consists of a number of limbic structures 
involved in memory and negative emotion (septal nuclei, 
amygdala, medial hypothalamus, frontal cortex).  Activation of 
the punishment system also activates the reticular activating 
system (via the amygdala, hypothalamus, thalamus, reticular 
formation, septal nuclei).  The punishment system has catabolic 
physiological effects, a negative inhibiting effect on 
processing, stimulates attention and consciousness, produces 
avoidance or aggressive behavior, and generates negative 
emotion.  The individual works to attenuate further stimulus 
processing and response and may enter a state of quiescence and 
behavioral inhibition or aggression and attack (Gray,1991; 
Joseph,1990,2000;Kissin,1986).  The punishment system acts to 
produce the three components of negative affective valence and 
emotion.   
 
AFFECTIVE VALENCE (STIMULUS-REINFORCEMENT ASSOCIATION) 
 
The two affective valence systems appear to work in opposition.  
The development of affective valence begins early in sensory 
processing, long before a sensory stimulus is recognized 
cognitively and consciously in the cerebral cortex (Kissin, 
1986;Joseph,1990,2000).  The effects of affective valence are 
relatively primitive and reflexive at subcortical levels but may 
be refined into higher-order emotional reactions at higher 
limbic and neocortical levels (Kissin,1986;Joseph,1990,2000).  
The affective valence systems act in close association with the 
reticular activating system for the regulation of attention and 
consciousness.  This may be important in the formation of 
emotion.  The reticular activating system is also active during 
other states of consciousness (inattentive states, meditation, 
and hypnosis) enabling the production of emotion during these 
states as well (Svorad,1957).  The affective valence systems 
appear to be instrumental in the development of emotion.  
Affective valence might be considered a determination of the 
emotional significance of a sensory stimulus and the first step 




The amygdaloid nuclei are small almond-shaped structures found 
in the deep medial-temporal region of the brain, just in front 
of the hippocampus.  The basolateral amygdaloid nuclei receive 
input from sensory pathways (Perryman et al,1987;Schutze et al, 
1987;Turner et al,1980;Van Hoesen,1981), reticular formation, 
specific and non-specific thalamic nuclei, olfactory pathways, 
anterior cingulate cortex, medial and lateral hypothalamus, and 
orbitofrontal cortex (Afifi & Bergman,1986;Blair,2008;John, 
2009).  The central amygdaloid nuclei project to a large number 
of structures in the brain that are involved in the behavioral, 
humoral, autonomic (physiological), and experiential signs of 
emotional reactions: the central grey for the arrest of ongoing 
behavior (freezing) or for the production of fight/flight 
behavior, the dorsal motor nucleus of the vagus nerve for 
changes in heart rate, the hypothalamus for changes in blood 
pressure and other autonomic changes, the parabrachial nuclei 
for changes in respiration (panting, respiratory distress during 
panic), the nucleus reticularis pontis caudalis for an increase 
in reflex excitability (startle response) and for the production 
of orientation and attention, the trigeminal motor nuclei for 
jaw movements, the facial motor nuclei for facial expressions, 
and the ventral tegmental area for an increase in dopaminergic, 
cholinergic, and noradrenergic actions in the cerebral cortex 
for increased vigilance, alerting, cortical processing, and 
learning (Davis et al,1991;Kapp et al,1990;LeDoux,1990; 
Weinberger et al,1990).  The amygdala is critical for the 
representation of stimulus-reinforcement (affective valence) 
associations (both reward and punishment-based) and the 
processing of emotional expressions (Blair,2008).  Distinct 
neurons in the amygdalae respond to positive and negative 
stimuli, but these neurons are not segregated to specific nuclei 
(Paton et al,2005).  The basolateral nucleus does more than 
simply control the central nucleus.  It enables the transmission 
of stimulus-reinforcement (affective valence) association 
information forward to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (areas 
10 and 11 of the orbitofrontal cortex, ventral anterior 
cingulate cortex) for emotion regulation, reinforcement-
expectancies for decision-making, and social behavior (Blair, 
2008;Budhani et al,2007;Etkin et al,2006;Pezawas et al,2005; 
Phillips et al,2003a,2003b;Rauch et al,2006;Rushworth et al, 
2007;Schoenbaum et Roesch,2005;Volz et al,2008).  Blair (2008) 
found that these critical functions are impaired in psychopathy 
(marked by emotional dysfunction, antisocial behavior, and poor 
decision-making) and result in its development.   
 
The amygdala plays a primary role in emotion and memory (Amunts 
et al,2005;Blair,2008).  People shown threatening faces, 
confronted with frightening situations, or with severe social 
phobia showed increased activation of the amygdala (Nathan et 
al,2006).  Depressed patients showed left amygdala hyperactivity 
when interpreting emotions for all faces, especially fearful 
faces, and this hyperactivity was normalized when the patients 
went on antidepressants (Sheline et al,2001).  Bipolar patients 
have considerably smaller amygdala and hippocampal volumes 
(Blumberg et al,2003).  Normal subjects exposed to frightening 
faces or faces of people from another race showed increased 
activation of the amygdala, even if the exposure was subliminal 
(Williams et al,2006).  However, the amygdala is not necessary 
for the processing of fear-related stimuli, since people which 
have bilateral amygdala damage show a rapid reaction to fearful 
faces, even in the absence of a functional amygdala (Tsuchiya et 
al,2009).  As early as 1888, Brown and Shafer showed that 
temporal cortex lesions (including the amygdala) in monkeys 
produced severe deficits in emotion and social behavior.  Kluver 
and Bucy (1939) showed that large anterior temporal lobe lesions 
caused overreaction to all objects, hypoemotionality, 
hypersexuality, hyperorality, and loss of fear (Kluver-Bucy 
Syndrome).  Terzian and Ore (1955) found that amygdala lesions 
reduce or abolish aggressive or violent behavior while Bunnel 
(1966) found such lesions produce social-emotional agnosia.  In 
1981, Appleton and Passingham found that lesions of the whole 
amygdala caused Kluver-Bucy Syndrome.  Emotionally-reflected 
speech, the ability to sing, and the ability to carry melody may 
be affected with right-sided amygdala lesions (Joseph,1988a, 
1990).  Stimulation of the amygdala may produce sustained 
orientation and attention, fear and/or anger, rage reactions 
(Egger & Flynn,1963;Gunne & Lewander,1966;Ursin & Kaada,1960; 
Zybrozyna,1963), intense changes in facial expressions, 
grimacing, baring the teeth, pupil dilation, licking, chewing, 
smacking of the lips, tearing (Anand & Dua,1955;Ursin & Kaada, 
1960), and emotional sounds (Robinson,1967;Ursin & Kaada,1960).  
Stimulation of the amygdala increases sexual activity and 
aggression, while harm to the amygdala causes the opposite 
effects (Brink,2008).  The medial-temporal region of the brain 
is prone to develop seizure activity (temporal lobe epilepsy-
Joseph,1990).  Emotional reactions may be distorted or 
inappropriate in temporal lobe epilepsy (Gloor,1960;Joseph, 
1990;Kluver & Bucy,1939).   
 
Much of the wiring system of the amygdala appears to be innate, 
but it is subject to plastic change and learning (Davis et al, 
1991).  The amygdala represents the positive or negative value 
(valence) of sensory stimuli during learning (Blair,2008;Paton 
et al,2005).  The amygdala has been implicated in the 
acquisition and expression of classical (Pavlovian) fear 
conditioning (a form of conditioning of emotional responses) and 
long-term potentiation appears to be involved (Amunts et al, 
2005;Blair et al,2001;Helmuth,2003;Marin,1999;Pare et al,2002; 
Paton et al,2005;Sapolsky,2003).  Damage to the amygdala was 
shown to impair the acquisition and expression of Pavlovian fear 
conditioning (Amunts et al,2005).  The amygdala is also involved 
in appetitive (positive) conditioning (Blair,2008;Paton et al, 
2005).   
 
The amygdala plays a primary role in the formation and storage 
of memories associated with emotional events and it appears to 
be the role of the amygdala to regulate memory consolidation in 
other brain regions (Marin,1999).  The amygdala has many 
connections with the hippocampus (more going to the hippocampus 
than received from it-Ben Best,The amygdala and the emotions, 
Anatomical Basis Of Mind,Ch.9,see website) and emotions can 
facilitate the encoding of memories (Gasbarri & Tomaz,2012).  
Increased amygdala activation immediately after an event (such 
as emotional arousal) increases the strength and retention of 
the memory of that event (Asari et al,2010;Hutcherson et al, 
2008;Nathan et al,2006;Pare et al,2002).  The more emotionally-
arousing the event, the greater is the activation of the 
amygdala (especially the basolateral nuclei) and the greater the 
strength and retention of the memory of the event.   
 
The amygdala plays a substantial role in mental states and is 
related to a number of psychological disorders.  Lesions of the 
medial temporal lobe usually produce in their early stages 
severe emotional symptoms, fear, aggression, anxiety, 
irritability, inappropriate sexual activity, over-attention to 
external stimuli, distractibility, periods of apathy or 
restlessness, paranoid symptoms, and hallucinations (Bogarts, 
1997).  The amygdala plays an important role in modulating 
vigilance, social relations, and generating negative emotional 
states and is abnormally reactive in mood and emotional 
disorders (Donegan et al,2003).  Donegan and coworkers (2003) 
found that amygdala hyperreactivity contributes to 
hypervigilance, emotion dysregulation, and disturbed 
interpersonal relations in borderline personality disorder.  
Amygdala connections are more widespread from the left amygdala 
in heterosexual women and homosexual men, while amygdala 
connections are more widespread from the right amygdala in 
heterosexual men and homosexual women (Swaab,2007,2008).  The 
amygdalae of males also tend to be larger than those of females 
(Caviness et al,1996;Goldstein et al,2001).  These differences 
might account for some of the differences in emotional 
expression and social behavior of men and women.  Amygdala 
volume correlates positively with both size and complexity of 
social networks (Bickart et al,2010;Szalavitz et al,2010).  
People with larger amygdalae have larger and more complex social 
networks than people with smaller amygdalae.  People with larger 
amygdalae also make more accurate social judgments about other 
people’s faces (Bzdok et al,2011).  Larger amygdalae may allow 
for greater emotional intelligence, enabling better social 
integration and cooperation (Buchanan et al,2009).  There appear 
to be functional differences between the two amygdalae.  
Stimulation of the right amygdala induced negative emotions, 
while stimulation of the left amygdala induced either positive 
or negative emotions (Lanteaume et al,2007).  Other evidence 
indicates the left amygdala is part of the reward system (Murray 




The prefrontal cortex is the central executive of the brain, 
mediating specific functions carried out by other cortical and 
subcortical structures (Petrides & Pandya,2007;John,2009).  As 
will be seen, the prefrontal cortex is also involved in focal 
attention and the formation of conscious experiences, including 
emotions.  The prefrontal cortex consists of three distinct 
cytoarchitectural and functional areas (John,2009;Petrides & 
Pandya,1999;Preuss & Goldman-Rakic,1991).  The dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex is the central executive for cognitive 
control, while the orbital prefrontal cortex (orbitofrontal 
cortex) is the central executive for emotion and social control 
(Stuss & Levine,2002).  The medial prefrontal cortex (anterior 
cingulate cortex) mediates drive or motivation (Licter & 
Cummings,2001;Stuss et al,1986).  Each subdivision of the 
prefrontal cortex does not produce its functions exclusively.  
Each is connected to a series of subcortical areas (striatum, 
pallidum, substantia nigra pars reticulata, subthalamic nucleus, 
thalamus) which lead back to the same prefrontal subdivision 
from which it arose to form a functionally-segregrated circuit 
or loop (Alexander et al,1986;Dolan et al,1999).  These 
prefrontal-subcortical circuits have open connections with other 
cortical and subcortical areas, of which those with the 
temporal-limbic cortex (left hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, 
amygdala, pallidal internal segment, superior temporal gyrus) 
appear to be the most important (Bogarts,1997;Petrides & Pandya, 
2007).  Specific neurobehavioral syndromes have been linked to 
preferential involvement of each of these circuits (Duffy & 
Campbell,2001).  These are the dysexecutive syndrome, the 
disinhibition or pseudopsychopathic syndrome, and the apathetic 
or pseudodepressive syndrome, linked to preferential involvement 
of the dorsolateral, orbitofrontal, or anterior cingulate 
circuits respectively (Duffy & Campbell,2001;Licter & Cummings, 
2001).  These syndromes, along with the behavioral disorders 
associated with dysfunction of brain areas connected through 
open connections, bear striking resemblance to the symptom 
dimensions and neurocognitive dysfunctions seen in the group of 
conditions collectively known as schizophrenia (John,2009).         
 
DORSOLATERAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX (DLPFC) 
 
The DLPFC consists of areas 6 and 8, the lateral part of areas 
9-12, and areas 44-47 (Joseph,1990;Philip & Miller,2002).  The 
DLPFC is connected to the orbitofrontal cortex, anterior 
cingulate cortex, thalamus, basal ganglia, hippocampus, and 
temporal, parietal, and occipital cortex (Alexander et al,1990; 
Cavada,1984;Fuster,1989;Goldman-Rakic,1990;Groenewegen et al, 
1990;Kolb,1990;Pandya & Yeterian,1990;Philip & Miller,2002; 
Uylings & Van Eden,1990).  The DLPFC is involved in the 
integration of sensory and memory information, the regulation of 
intellectual function, and is the highest cortex for motor 
planning, organization, and regulation (Fuster,1997,2000,2008; 
Goldman-Rakic,1990;Hale & Fiorello,2004;Philip & Miller,2002).  
As will be seen, the DLPFC participates in focal attention and 
the formation of conscious experiences, including emotions.   
 
The DLPFC has been shown to consist of a number of different 
regions, each region having different inputs and projecting to 
different target areas (Groenewegen et al,1990;Kolb,1990;Pandya 
& Yeterian,1990).  Each region appears to be quite important in 
the mediation of a specific type of voluntary intentional action 
(action produced by choice for some purpose-Sieb,1995,2004,2007, 
2011).  For example, a region in area 9 receives input from the 
trunk and limb representations of somatosensory cortex and from 
association cortex involved in peripheral vision and projects to 
the supplementary motor cortex, premotor cortex, rostral motor 
cortex, basal ganglia, and cerebellum (Brooks,1986;Pandya & 
Yeterian,1990;Sieb,1987,1987,1989,1995).  The target areas of 
this region are involved in the preparation and execution of 
voluntary intentional skeletomotor movements (Brooks,1986;Sieb, 
1987,1987,1989,1995).  The supplementary motor cortex is 
involved in the preparation of voluntary intentional 
skeletomotor movements and the programming of voluntary 
intentional motor sequences (Brooks,1986;Hyland et al,1989;Mann 
et al,1988;Orgogozo & Larsen,1979;Roland et al,1980;Tanji et al, 
1988;Wiesendanger et al,1985).  The supplementary motor cortex 
has been shown to be activated by movement intent, even if no 
movement occurs (Brooks,1986;Roland et al,1980).  The 
supplementary motor cortex drives the execution of voluntary 
intentional skeletomotor movements via projection to the 
premotor cortex, rostral motor cortex, basal ganglia, and 
cerebellum (Afifi & Bergman,1986;Brooks,1986;Porter & Lemon, 
1993;Primrose & Strick,1985;Sieb,1987,1987,1989,1995).  
Similarly, other regions in the DLPFC have been identified 
(Joseph,1990;Pandya & Yeterian,1990;Sieb,1995) which appear to 
be involved in the production of other types of voluntary 
intentional actions (area 44 or Broca’s area-speech; part of 
areas 8 and 9 of the frontal eye fields-scanning eye movements; 
the border region of areas 6, 8, and 46-Exner’s writing area; 
area 10-memory, thought; areas 10 and 11-emotion, social 
behavior).  The output of DLPFC regions therefore appears to be 
directed to cortical and subcortical areas involved in the 
preparation and execution of various types of voluntary 
intentional actions (skeletomotor movements, oculomotor 
movements, speech, writing, reading, emotion, social behavior, 
memory, and thought).  Voluntary intentional actions are 
prepared and directed by focal attention (working memory) and 
consciousness (Fuster,1997,2008;Sieb,2004,2007,2011).  The DLPFC 
utilizes working memory in the mediation of its motor functions 
(Fuster,1997,2008;Goldman-Rakic,1990).  In the absence of 
attention and consciousness, no such actions occur (sleep, coma, 
or anesthesia).  The DLPFC therefore appears to be driven by 
attention and consciousness to produce various voluntary 
intentional actions.  Attention and consciousness also appear to 
be utilized by the DLPFC to mediate intellectual (cognitive) 
functions (executive memory, language comprehension and 
production, grammar, abstract thinking, planning, problem-
solving, decision-making, logic, reasoning, calculating).     
 
Damage to the DLPFC produces the dysexecutive syndrome (Duffy & 
Campbell,2001;John,2009;Licter & Cummings,2001).  This syndrome 
is characterized by problems with attention, affect, social 
judgment, executive memory, abstract thinking, intentionality, 
and motivation: difficulty altering set in response to changing 
contingencies, impaired strategy generation for solving complex 
problems, memory retrieval deficit, impaired verbal fluency, 
poor abstraction, concrete and perseverative thinking, impaired 
reasoning and mental flexibility, and reduced mental control.  
Such patients are inattentive and easily distractible, may need 
constant redirection, and may exhibit disorganized behavior.   
  
ORBITOFRONTAL CORTEX (OFC) 
 
The OFC consists of the prefrontal cortex immediately 
surrounding the orbit of the eye.  The OFC consists of areas 10, 
11, and 47 (Kringelbach,2005).  The OFC is primary for the 
production of emotion, social behavior, and reinforcement- 
expectancies for decision-making (Blair,2008;Rushworth et al, 
2007;Schoenbaum & Roesch,2005;Volz et al,2008).  The OFC is 
considered the central executive for emotion and social control 
(John,2009;Stuss & Levine,2002).  Stimulus-reinforcement 
association (affective valence) input from the amygdala is 
essential for these functions of the OFC (Blair,2008;Lanteaume 
et al,2007;Murray et al,2009;Rushworth et al,2007;Schoenbaum & 
Roesch,2005).  The OFC is interconnected with the higher 
cortical sensory association areas (areas 5,7,18,19,20,21,22), 
DLPFC, anterior cingulate cortex, superior temporal cortex, 
inferior parietal cortex, parahippocampal gyrus, hippocampus, 
thalamus, parts of the basal ganglia, hypothalamus, and amygdala 
(Alexander et al,1986;Blair,2008;Dolan et al,1999;Fuster,1997; 
John,2009;Johnson et al,1968;Jones & Powell,1970;Joseph,1989, 
1990,2000;Pandya & Kuypers,1969;Rauch et al,2006;Rushworth et 
al,2007;Van Hoesen et al,1972).  The OFC has been found to 
utilize affective valence to influence emotional reactions 
(Kringelbach & Rolls,2004;Phillips et al,2003a,b;Sauerland et 
al,1967;Siegel & Wang,1974;Steriade,1964;Volz et al,2008).  
Kringelbach and Rolls (2004) found that activity in the medial 
OFC was associated with the monitoring, learning, and memory of 
the reward value of reinforcers, while activity in the lateral 
OFC was associated with the evaluation of punishers.  They found 
that more complex reinforcers (like monetary gain or loss) are 
represented more anterior in the OFC than less complex 
reinforcers (taste).  Volz and coworkers (2008) also found the 
OFC involved in evaluation of reinforcement (affective valence) 
and in emotion.  Volz found that the OFC continuously extracts 
affect-laden recognition patterns or cues (stimulus-
reinforcement associations, affective valence) from sensory 
input, associates these with prior experiences with general 
categories (perception), and is responsible for a subjective 
sense of perceptual coherence of environmental information (the 
formation of emotion).  Kringelbach (2005) found that the OFC 
mediates subjective hedonic experience (a conscious experience 
of a positive emotion) from reward (a positive affective 
valence).  Hence the OFC appears to mediate the production of 
emotion from affective valence.  The OFC is connected with the 
inferior parietal cortex.  As will be seen, the OFC participates 
in focal attention and the formation of emotion from perception 
via its interaction with the inferior parietal cortex.  The 
ability to shift attention (Butter et al,1970;Joseph,1990,2000; 
Kolb et al,1974;Luria,1980) and the ability to discriminate 
between relevant and irrelevant stimuli (Bechara et al,1994; 
Fuster,1990b,1997;Oscar-Berman,1975;Rolls et al,1994) are 
reduced with OFC damage.  Complete destruction of the OFC may 
produce the complete loss of emotion and social behavior (Kling 
& Steklis,1976;Myers et al,1973).  Severe damage greatly reduces 
emotional/motivational function, including motor activity 
(Butter et al,1970).  Less extensive damage produces loss of 
emotional control, leading to such emotional and social 
behavioral dysfunctions as disinhibition, hyperactivity, 
hypersexuality, euphoria, extroversion, lability, verbosity, 
perseveration (Bechara et al,1994;Rolls et al,1994), excessive 
swearing, irresponsibility, antisocial behavior, poor social 
interaction, poor empathizing ability, impulsivity, compulsive 
gambling, drug use (including alcohol and tobacco), 
inappropriate laughter, aggression, or a demanding manner 
(Benson & Geschwind,1971;Blumer & Benson,1975;Butter et al,1970; 
Kolb et al,1974;Lishman,1973;Luria,1980;Stuss & Benson,1984).  
Damage to the OFC may produce what is called the disinhibition 
or pseudopsychopathic syndrome (Duffy & Campbell,2001;Licter & 
Cummings,2001;John,2009).  This syndrome is characterized by 
disinhibition, diminished self-supervision of behavior, 
distractibility, impulsiveness, tactlessness and loss of 
interpersonal sensitivity/empathy, utilization and imitation 
behavior, inappropriate jocularity, sexual preoccupation and 
jesting, hypomanic symptoms, neglect of personal care, poor 
hygiene, decreased social judgment, antisocial acts, and limited 
insight.  Such a syndrome appeared in Phineas Gage, after a 3.5 
foot metal rod was blown vertically through his brain passing 
just behind his left orbit (KSPS TV Production,How Smart Can We 
Get?Nova Science Now,2012).  Right OFC damage seems to cause the 
most severe disruption of mood, emotion, and social behavior 
(Grafman et al,1986). 
       
The OFC projects to the inhibitory medullary reticular formation 
and the excitatory pontine reticular formation (Fuster,1997; 
Sauerland et al,1967;Siegel et al,1977).  The OFC may influence 
physiological and behavioral reactions via this connection.  
Damage to the OFC releases the autonomic nervous system from 
inhibitory control, leading to widespread disturbances of 
autonomic function (Joseph,1990;Kaada,1951,1972).  The OFC is 
connected to the DLPFC.  The OFC was found to be involved in 
planning behavior associated with sensitivity to reward and 
punishment (Bechara et al,1994).  The OFC is interconnected with 
the medial magnocellular dorsomedial thalamic nuclei (Fuster, 
1997;Sauerland et al,1967;Siegel et al,1977).  The dorsomedial 
thalamic nuclei gate input to the neocortex and limbic system 
(Joseph,1990,2000;Skinner & Yingling,1977;Yingling & Skinner, 
1977).  The dorsomedial thalamic nuclei are reciprocally and 
topographically connected with the DLPFC and make up its 
defining projection (Fuster,1997;Joseph,1990,2000;Kolb,1990; 
Uylings & Van Eden,1990).  Hence the OFC could influence DLPFC 
function via this connection as well.   
   
ANTERIOR CINGULATE CORTEX (ACC) 
 
The ACC (area 25) is the frontal part of the cingulate cortex 
and is a distinct cytoarchitectural and functional region of the 
prefrontal cortex (John,2009;Petrides & Pandya,1999;Preuss & 
Goldman-Rakic,1991).  The DLPFC and supplementary motor cortex 
may have evolved from the ACC (Sanides,1972) and these areas are 
massively interconnected (Damasio & Van Hoesen,1980).  
Electrical stimulation of the ACC produces fragments of 
movements (Goldberg,1985) and vocalizations (Robinson,1967).  
The ACC is also connected with the lateral amygdala, septal 
nuclei, hippocampus, anterior hypothalamus, striatum, 
dorsomedial thalamic nuclei, inferior parietal cortex, and OFC 
(Baleydiere & Maguiere,1980;Pandya & Kuypers,1969;Powell,1978; 
Powell et al,1974).  Electrical stimulation of the ACC also 
produces anxiety, fear, and pleasure (Meyer et al,1973).  As 
will be seen, the ACC appears to be involved in focal attention 
and the production of emotion via its connections with the 
inferior parietal cortex.  Regulation of autonomic function, 
detection of errors, monitoring of conflict, expectation of 
reward or loss (reinforcement-expectancies, anticipation of 
outcomes), decision-making, attention, motivation, and 
regulation of emotion are some of the functions that have been 
attributed to the ACC (Bush et al,2000;Decety & Jackson,2004; 
Drevets et al,2008;Jackson et al,2006;John,2009;Lictor & 
Cummings,2001;Nieuwenhuis et al,2001;Posner & Digirolamo,1998; 
Stuss et al,1986;Weissman et al,2005).  The key functions of the 
ACC appear to revolve around the detection of errors or 
shortfalls from some standard, anticipation and preparation for 
action, and regulation of emotion.  Lesions of the ACC result in 
inability to detect errors, severe difficulty resolving conflict 
in Stroop tasks, emotional instability, inattention, and 
akinetic mutism (Bush et al,2000;Posner & Digirolamo,1998).  
Lesions of the ACC may result in the apathetic or 
pseudodepressive syndrome (Duffy & Campbell,2001;John,2009; 
Licter & Cummings,2001).  This syndrome is characterized by 
apathy (a loss of motivation or drive): emotional apathy-absence 
of interest, excitement, and intensity of emotional 
responsiveness to positive or negative events; affective apathy-
flat, unchanging emotional expression; cognitive apathy-
decreased generative thinking, curiosity, engagement with usual 
activities, interest in learning and new experiences, and lack 
of concern with one’s health, family, or future; motor apathy-
lack of effort, productivity, ability to sustain activities, and 
initiation of new activities, increased dependence on others to 
structure activities, difficulty in initiating motor acts, 
hesitation when starting a new movement, and tendency to not 
gesture when speaking.  Akinetic mutism may present with 
bilateral ACC damage.             
 
REGULATION OF EMOTION      
 
The dorsal (perigenual) ACC and the ventral (subgenual) ACC have 
different connections, are part of different circuits, and have 
different functions.  In fact, the ACC has been separated into a 
ventral emotional component and a dorsal cognitive component 
(Bush et al,2000;Bush et al,2002).  Both components may be 




Neuroimaging, neuropathological, and lesion analysis data 
indicate an extended neural network formed by the connections of 
the ventral ACC with the OFC, amygdala, hippocampus, superior 
and medial temporal gyri, ventral striatum, mid and posterior 
cingulate cortex, thalamus, hypothalamus, periaqueductal gray, 
and habenula (Ongur et al,2003).  This network has been found to 
be involved in the regulation of the evaluative, expressive, and 
experiential aspects of emotion (Alexander et al,1986;Blair, 
2008;Bruno et al,2004;Dolan et al,1999;Rauch et al,2006).  
Abnormal interactions between the ventral ACC and other areas of 
the network may contribute to disturbances in emotional 
processing and regulation (Ongur et al,1998).  In emotional 
disorders (depression, panic attacks, phobias, bipolar disorder, 
posttraumatic stress disorder) increased activation occurs in 
the ventral ACC and the amygdala (Ressler & Mayberg,2007).  This 
increased activation decreased with resolution of the disorder 
through treatment (medications, behavioral therapy, electroshock 
therapy, magnetic stimulation techniques, or deep stimulation 
techniques).  Impaired function within the network appears to 
give rise to the clinical signs and symptoms of depression or 
mania (Drevets et al,2008).  The ventral ACC was found to 
undergo a substantial reduction in gray matter volume (mostly 
due to reduction in glia cells) in the mood disorders of major 
depression and bipolar (Drevets et al,1997;Drevets et al,2008; 
Ongur et al,1998).  A reduction in gray matter volume was also 
detected in the brain areas connected to the ventral ACC, 
indicating that these areas are interconnected and part of a 
common circuit (Drevets et al,1997;Drevets et al,2008;Ongur et 
al,1998).  This reduction in gray matter volume was accompanied 
by an increase in ventral ACC activity, which was decreased (the 
activity) by administration of antidepressants or by remission 
(Drevets et al,2008).  Lithium (a mood stabilizer) has a 
neurotrophic effect and increased the gray matter volume when 
used in the successful treatment of bipolar disorder (Drevets et 
al,2008).  A reduction in gray matter volume in the ACC was also 
found in obsessive-compulsive disorder (Davidson et al,2003).  
In mood disorders, ventral ACC activity correlates positively 
with the severity of depressive symptoms (Osuch et al,2000).  
Humans with lesions which include the ventral ACC demonstrate 
abnormal autonomic responses to emotional experiences 
(understimulation of parasympathetic tone may occur in mood 
disorders), inability to experience emotion related to concepts 
that normally evoke emotion, and inability to use information 
regarding the likelihood of punishment versus reward 
(reinforcement-expectancies) in guiding social behavior (Bechara 
et al,1994;Damasio,1995;Drevets et al,2008).  Patients with 
lesions to the ACC have diminished autonomic reactivity and 
reduced variations of affect to stressors (such as shocks), 
without affecting the capacity to control cognitive processes 
(Critchley et al,2003).  The ACC appears to be involved in the 
experience of sadness and anxiety (Barrett,2006;Mauss & 
Robinson,2009;Phan et al,2002).  Studies suggest that the 
ventral ACC functions in the automatic regulation of emotion 
(Elliott et al,2000;George et al,1995;Gillath et al,2005;Mayberg 
et al,1999;Phelps et al,2004;Rauch & Drevets,2008).  The ventral 
ACC receives emotional input (affective valence, stimulus-
reinforcement association information) from the amygdala 
(Budhani et al,2007;Pezawas et al,2005).  The ventral ACC may be 
involved in evaluating the salience of rewards, as it modulates 
electrophysiological responses of ventral tegmental area 
dopamine neurons (Drevets et al,1998).  The phasic burst firing 
of these neurons and the accompanying rise in dopamine release 
normally occurs in response to primary rewards and reward-
predicting stimuli (Schultz,1997).  In depression, reduced 
ventral ACC activity is associated with diminished stimulation 
of mesolimbic dopamine release, resulting in the absence of 
behavioral incentive, apathy, and anhedonia (Drevets et al, 
1998).  In mania, increased ventral ACC activity results in 
excessive stimulation of mesolimbic dopamine release, producing 
exaggerated hedonia response and elevated motivational drive 
(Drevets et al,1998).  The ventral ACC is critical for the 
representation of stimulus-reinforcement association (affective 
valence) information that can be used by other structures for 
the regulation of emotion, reinforcement-expectancies for 
decision-making, and behavior (Blair,2008;Rushworth et al,2007; 
Schoenbaum & Roesch,2005).  The precise role played by the 
ventral ACC and the OFC in reinforcement-expectancies for 
decision-making is as yet not understood (Rushworth et al,2007).     
 
DORSAL ACC 
 The dorsal (perigenual) ACC is connected to the prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC, OFC, other parts of the ACC), parietal cortex, 
hippocampus, motor system, and frontal eye fields (Allman et al, 
2006;Damasio & Van Hoesen,1980;Posner & Digirolamo,1998).   
Summarizing the evidence gained from electrical studies, the 
dorsal ACC appears to receive information about a stimulus, 
selects an appropriate response, monitors the response, and 
adapts behavior if there is a violation of expectancy or error 
(Bush et al,2000;Gehring et al,1993;Holyroyd et al,2004;Luu & 
Pederson,2004).  The rostral ACC (part of the perigenual ACC) 
was found to be active after error commission (a response 
function), while the dorsal ACC was found to respond to error 
and feedback of the error-an evaluative function (Bush et al, 
2002;Carter et al,1998;Polli et al,2005).  The evaluation 
function of the dorsal ACC was emotional in nature and 
indicative of the amount of distress associated with a certain 
error (Bush et al,2000).   
 
The most basic form of dorsal ACC theory states that the dorsal 
ACC is involved in error detection (Bush et al,2000).  A typical 
task which activates the dorsal ACC involves eliciting some sort 
of conflict in an individual that has the potential to result in 
error (Eriksen flanker task-Botvinik et al,1999;Stroop task-
Pardo et al,1990).  The dorsal ACC has been found to do more 
than merely detect error.  It was found to be active during 
correct responses as well (Carter et al,1998).  In addition, the 
more competitive are the stimuli, the greater the activation of 
the dorsal ACC (Carter et al,1998).  Luu and Pederson (2004) and 
Polli and coworkers (2005) found that the dorsal ACC was active 
when subjects were not aware of their errors and that awareness 
of errors increases dorsal ACC activation and results in the 
production of fewer errors.  Brown and Braver (2005) and Bush 
and coworkers (2002) found the dorsal ACC involved in the 
evaluation of the magnitude or cost of errors or shortfalls.  
Damage to the dorsal ACC causes difficulty in evaluating the 
consequences of social behavior and difficulty in evaluating the 
outcome of the treatment of mood disorders (Drevets et al,2008).  
Thus the dorsal ACC appears to detect error, evaluate the degree 
of error, and selects an appropriate form of action to be 
implemented by the motor system (Bush et al,2002;Polli et al, 
2005;Taylor et al,2006).     
 
Rather than representing errors or shortfalls, the dorsal ACC 
might be most active when conflicts between competing tendencies 
arise (Botvinik et al,1999;Carter et al,1998).  Trials that 
produced the most conflict also produced the greatest activation 
of the dorsal ACC (Botvinik et al,1999).  Patients with ADHD 
were found to have damage to the dorsal ACC and difficulty 
evaluating conflict during Stroop tasks (Bush et al,1999).  
Patients with schizophrenia also were found to have damage to 
the dorsal ACC and difficulty dealing with conflict in Stroop-
like tasks (Holyroyd et al,2004).  However, it has been found 
that lesions to the dorsal ACC do not eliminate the processing 
of errors and conflicts (Baird et al,2006;Nachev et al,2006) and 
many executive functions, including the monitoring of errors and 
conflicts, remain intact after large dorsal ACC lesions (review 
by Critchley et al,2005).  Dorsal ACC activity therefore appears 
not to be involved in error or conflict processing per se, but 
is correlated with error or conflict processing occurring 
somewhere else.     
 
Many of the functions of the dorsal ACC appear to be correlated 
with awareness (consciousness).  As described above, the 
response of the dorsal ACC to error or conflict is correlated 
with awareness (the evaluation of error or conflict by the 
dorsal ACC is therefore correlated with awareness).  Lane and 
coworkers (1998) showed that ACC activity reflected improved 
recognition of emotional cues and targets in subjects with 
better emotional awareness.  The dorsal ACC seems to be 
especially active when effort is required for the performance of 
a task, such as early learning and problem-solving (Allman et 
al,2001).  Allman and coworkers (2001) and Critchley and 
coworkers (2003) found that the dorsal ACC was most active 
during effortful context-dependent tasks.  Effort is defined as 
conscious exertion (Merriam-Webster).  The ACC is larger on one 
side of the brain than the other.  Morton and Rafto (2010) found 
that agency or will (a type of conscious experience, awareness) 
reside in the hemisphere with the larger ACC.  ACC activity 
remains elevated in tasks which involve adherence to sequential 
decision-making paths (Stroop tasks-Pardo et al,1990).  
Awareness is central to the performance of these tasks.  
Rehearsing a task which originally produced spontaneous, novel 
responses (which requires awareness) to the point of producing 
stereotyped rigid responses (which are automatic, not requiring 
awareness) resulted in diminished ACC activation (Raichle et al, 
1994).  The dorsal ACC might regulate emotion using the same 
mechanism as it uses for the evaluation of errors (Compton et 
al,2008).  The dorsal ACC might detect and evaluate undesirable 
emotion or shortfalls from some optimal emotion.   
 
Both the dorsal ACC and the DLPFC have been shown to be involved 
in emotion regulation (Bouregard et al,2001;Kalisch et al,2005; 
Ochsner et al,2004).  Proficient performance on tasks which 
purportedly utilize the dorsal ACC and DLPFC (like the 
adjustment of performance after errors) tends to correlate with 
emotional well-being, such as diminished anxiety (Compton et al, 
2008;Robinson,2007).  Remember, the DLPFC is the central 
executive for cognitive function.  Reward-based learning theory 
suggests that the dorsal ACC is involved in reward-based 
decision-making and learning, while the rostral ACC is involved 
in the emotional responses that arise (Bush et al,2002;Polli et 
al,2005;Taylor et al,2006;Volz et al,2008).  The dorsal ACC 
might bias response selection with expectations of reward or 
loss, ie. with reinforcement-expectancies (Holyroyd et al,2004).  
The DLPFC might be more involved in the implementation of 
adjustments (Garavan et al,2002).  Mayberg and coworkers (2005) 
found that electrical stimulation of the dorsal ACC curbed 
depression in some patients.  They concluded that the dorsal ACC 
is a conduit between the cognitive functions of the prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC) and the emotional experiences of the medial 
temporal limbic system and that this system was overactive in 
depression.  The supragenual (dorsal) ACC was found to suppress 
the amygdala (Etkin et al,2006;Pezawas et al,2005) and hence 
change emotion generation.  The dorsal ACC has been considered 
an interface between cognition and emotion (Bush et al,2000; 
Mayberg et al,2005;Volz et al,2008).  Hence the dorsal ACC may 
be involved in what might be called the cognitive regulation of 
emotion.         
   
LIE-DETECTION 
 
Traditional lie detection depends on various technologies that 
measure physiological (blood pressure, galvanic skin response, 
heart rate) or behavioral (facial micro-expressions, eye 
tracking movements, pupil size, body language such as gestures 
or postures, and various linguistic indicators like voice 
analysis, word composition, and word patterns) reactions that 
accompany deception (Pjister,2011;Preston,2002;Rothwell,2006).  
Many of these reactions are under autonomic control and are more 
or less involuntary and very difficult to control consciously.  
It is thought that the physiological and behavioral reactions 
that occur during deception are part of an emotional reaction 
arising from putting the lie together.  Utilizing fMRI (Ganguli, 
2007;Langleben,2005), it was found that regions in the 
prefrontal cortex (specifically the superomedial and 
inferolateral) and parietal cortex are more active during 
deception than when telling the truth.  These are just the areas 
(dorsal ACC, DLPFC/OFC, and inferior parietal cortex) that one 
would expect to be active during the cognitive regulation of 
emotion.   
 MOOD AND EMOTIONAL DISORDERS 
 
There are therefore two regulatory systems involved in the 
regulation of emotion: the ventral system and the dorsal system.  
There are distinct patterns of structural and functional 
abnormality in the two systems which may be responsible for the 
specific symptoms of various mood and emotional disorders (John, 
2009;Ongur et al,1998;Phillip et al,2003b;Ressler & Mayberg, 
2007).  The affective valence systems, amygdala, DLPFC, OFC, 
ACC, and IPC appear to be key structures involved.       
 
 
POSITIVE FEEDBACK AND NONLINEAR EMERGENCE 
 
Positive feedback and nonlinear emergence is a basic physical 
mechanism responsible for a vast number of natural phenomena-
flames, waves, groups, hurricanes, businesses, organisms, 
individuals, etc. (Scott,1996,1999,2000,personal communication; 
Sieb,2004,2007,2011).  Positive feedback is excitatory feedback 
(Scott,1996,1999,2000;Sieb,2004,2007,2011).  It occurs when the 
output of a system feeds back as an additional excitatory input 
into the system.  A positive feedback cycle arises when the 
output of a system feeds back as an additional excitatory input 
into the system, which produces more output, producing more 
positive feedback, producing more output, and so on.  If 
unopposed, such a cycle results in an uncontrolled exponential 
increase in activation of the system (Scott,1996,1999,2000, 
personal communication;Sieb,2004,2007,2011) and the system would 
soon exhaust itself (like seizures).  However, this uncontrolled 
increase in activity is normally counteracted by inhibitory 
influences which act against the excitatory positive feedback to 
produce a balanced equilibrium state (otherwise, the system 
would be suppressed or exhausted).  The inhibitory influences 
are said to be nonlinear because they are variable and have 
variable effects, which are not entirely predictable (Gershenson 
& Heylighner,2004).  Because the balanced state emerges in a 
nonlinear manner, it is known as a nonlinear emergent state.  
Nonlinear emergent states are always new or novel.  They have 
new properties not present in the original external inputs from 
which they were developed (Newman,1997;Scott,1996,1999,2000, 
personal communication).  Nonlinear emergent states cannot be 
precisely predicted in advance from the original inputs from 
which they were developed as linearly-produced states can be 
(Gershenson & Heylighner,2004).  Nonlinear emergent states are 
fixed for a period of time and are said to be explicit (ie. they 
are fully realized physically and are considered discreet 
physical objects which can be directly utilized-O’Brien & Opie, 
1999).  Nonlinear emergent states therefore can affect other 
physical systems and processes.  Nonlinear emergent states 
developed from positive feedback have the following properties 
(Sieb,2011): they are system-generated, form rapidly, but do 
take time to form, persist for a period of time, are explicit, 
can affect other physical systems and processes, are complex, 
bounded, have content, have limited capacity, are variable, 
flexible, seamless, ineffable, transparent, serial in 
production, prone to interference, unified and coherent, and 
projected outwards.  All these properties have also been 
ascribed to conscious experience, including emotion (Baars,1988; 
Koch,1998;Tononi & Edelman,1998).  This suggests that conscious 
experiences, including emotions, may arise from positive 
feedback and nonlinear emergence.   
 
EXAMPLES OF POSITIVE FEEDBACK AND NONLINEAR EMERGENCE 
 
There are many examples of phenomena arising from positive 
feedback and nonlinear emergence (Scott,1996,2000,personal 
communication;Sieb,2004,2007,2011).  One familiar example is a 
candle flame.  When a candle is lit (input), candle wax melts, 
producing wax vapor, which burns, dissipating heat and light 
(output).  Some of the dissipated heat feeds back (positive 
feedback) to melt more candle wax, producing more wax vapor, 
which burns, producing more heat, some of which feeds back, and 
so on, producing a positive feedback cycle.  Nonlinear 
inhibitory influences (cross-sectional area of the candle, loss 
of heat, air movement, air temperature, humidity, etc.) act to 
inhibit the excitatory influences (melting of candle wax, 
formation of wax vapor, burning of wax vapor, dissipation and 
feedback of heat).  The candle flame is a balanced equilibrium 
state that arises between the inhibitory and excitatory 
influences (a balanced dissipation of heat and light).  The 
candle flame therefore is a nonlinear emergent state and has all 
the properties mentioned in the preceding section.  As everyone 
knows, a candle flame is explicit (physical) and can affect 
other physical systems (one’s finger, inflammable objects).  The 
candle flame has properties not present in or predictable from 
the original external inputs from which it was developed (candle 
wax, wax vapor, match).  Waves (water, optical, sound) also may 
be explained through nonlinear emergence.  When a rock is thrown 
into a pond (input), water molecules are displaced outwards 
(output).  Displaced water molecules push against other adjacent 
water molecules, some of which rush in to fill the space 
previously occupied by the displaced water molecules (positive 
feedback).  This excitatory input further displaces water 
molecules outwards, which feeds back, producing further 
displacement, leading to a positive feedback cycle.  This 
positive feedback cycle is counteracted by nonlinear inhibitory 
influences (weight of water molecules, water temperature, depth, 
currents, obstacles, etc.) producing a wave (a balanced 
displacement of water molecules propagating outwards).  A wave 
is certainly explicit with new properties not present in or 
entirely predictable from the original inputs (rock, water 
molecules).  Any business may be described utilizing nonlinear 
emergence.  Money is utilized to set up an inventory or services 
(input).  Sale of the inventory or services results in the 
acquisition of more money (output).  Some of this money 
(positive feedback) is used to provide more inventory or 
services, and so on, resulting in a positive feedback cycle.  
Nonlinear inhibitory influences (number of employees, number of 
customers, amounts of money, size and type of the inventory or 
services, hours of operation, etc.) act to balance the 
disposition of money resulting in the nonlinear emergence of a 
specific business (a functioning Walmart store, Imperial Oil 
company, or Macdonald’s restaurant, etc.).  Nerve impulses, 
groups of people (committees, nations, families, etc.), stock 
markets, and many other phenomena may be described as arising 
from positive feedback and nonlinear emergence.  Conscious 
experiences (including emotions) may also arise from positive 
feedback and nonlinear emergence (Sieb,2004,2007,2011).   
 
PERCEPTION      
 
Conscious experiences (including emotions) appear to arise from 
perception (Mattingley,1999;Rowlands,2002;Velmans,1999).  
Perception is the interpretation of sensory stimulation in terms 
of previous experience (Merriam-Webster).  Perception appears to 
occur in the inferior parietal cortex-IPC (Mattingley,1999).  
The IPC is at the junction of the parietal, temporal, and 
occipital lobes of the brain and consists of the supramarginal 
(area 40) and angular (area 39) gyri, part of area 7, and is 
partly coextensive with the posterior superior temporal gyrus-
area 22 (Joseph,1990,2000).  The IPC contains neurons which are 
multimodally responsive, receiving highly processed input from 
somesthetic, visual, and auditory association cortex, the 
frontal lobes, and other higher-order assimilation areas 
throughout the neocortex (Bruce et al,1986;Burton & Jones,1976; 
Jones & Powell,1970;Joseph,1990,2000;Seltzer & Pandya,1978;Zeki, 
1974).  Note that the three regions of the prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC, OFC, and ACC) connect to the superior temporal gyrus and 
the IPC (Bogarts,1997;John,2009;Petrides & Pandya,2007).  All 
higher-order sensory processing converges on the IPC.  IPC 
neurons can simultaneously analyze visual, auditory, and 
somesthetic information, respond to visual stimuli of any size, 
shape, or form, and have visual receptive properties that span 
almost the entire visual field (Bruce et al,1982,1986;Hyvarinen 
& Shelepin,1979;Joseph,1990,2000).  The IPC is involved in the 
creation and assimilation of cross modal associations (auditory, 
visual, and somesthetic equivalents of objects, events, ideas, 
actions, feelings-Joseph,1990,2000).  This is perception.  
Damage to the left IPC may cause anomia, object and finger 
agnosia, acalculia, most forms of apraxia, agraphia, left-right 
disorientation, pure word blindness, alexia, conductive aphasia, 
disruption of sequential-grammatical relationships, disruption 
of spatial-sequential ability, impairment of visual-spatial 
functioning, impairment of temporal-sequencing ability, 
disruption of the performance of skilled temporal-sequential 
motor acts, and the impairment of logic and grammar (Benson et 
al,1973;Heilman,1973,1979;Hechaen & Albert,1978;Joseph,1990, 
2000;Luria,1980;Sauguet et al,1971;Straub & Geschwind,1983; 
Vignolo,1983).  Dressing apraxia and constructional apraxia may 
occur with right IPC damage (Hier et al,1983;Mehta et al,1987; 
Joseph,1988a,1990,2000).  Note that impaired formation of 
conscious experiences could result in all these disruptions.  It 
is interesting to note that the parietal cortex of Albert 
Einstein’s brain was 15% greater in size than in any other human 
brain on file (KSPS TV Program,How Smart Can We Get?,Nova 
Science Now,2012).  Einstein was noted for his extraordinary 




Neglect syndrome may occur with damage to the IPC (Joseph,1990, 
2000;Mattingley,1999;Prinz,Lecture at Towards A Science Of 
Consciousness (TASOC) 2012 Conference).  Loss of dreaming (a 
type of conscious experience) can occur with parietal cortex 
damage (Solms,M.,In “What Are Dreams?”,KSPS Nova TV Program, 
2009).  Neglect (hemineglect, unilateral neglect, spatial 
neglect, hemispatial neglect) syndrome is a deficit in awareness 
(conscious experience) of one side of space that occurs as a 
result of brain damage (Husain,2008;Unsworth,2007).  Neglect is 
not due to lack of sensation or ability to move, but appears to 
be caused by an inability to pay proper attention to sensory 
stimuli (Husain,2008;Unsworth,2007).  Even though the person 
with neglect is unaware of sensory stimuli, appreciable 
processing of the stimuli still appears to occur, even to the 
point of identity and meaning (Berti & Rizzolatti,1992;Rees, 
2001;Rees et al,2000).  The neglect may extend to the visual, 
auditory, somatosensory, and olfactory domains (Husain,2008; 
Unsworth,2007).  Neglect is most profound and long-lasting with 
damage to the right cerebral hemisphere with the awareness 
deficit to left (contralateral) space (Husain,2008;Unsworth, 
2007).  Left hemisphere damage may produce a less prolonged and 
long-lasting neglect of right space (Husain,2008;Kim et al, 
1999).  Neglect has classically been associated with lesions of 
the right posterior parietal cortex, particularly in the right 
temporoparietal junction or inferior parietal lobe (Husain, 
2008;Mattingley,1999;Vallar & Perani,1986), in other words, in 
the right IPC.  Isolated lesions of the right frontal lobe have 
also been associated with neglect of left space (Husain & 
Kennard,1996).  Severe left unilateral inattention and neglect 
is seen with massive lesions to the right frontal lobe of the 
brain (Joseph,1988a,1988b,1990,2000).  Subcortical lesions (such 
as of the basal ganglia and thalamus), without involvement of 
the overlying cortex, can lead to neglect (Hillis et al,2002; 
Hillis et al,2005).  Damage to white matter pathways connecting 
posterior and frontal cortical areas has also been implicated in 
neglect (Bartolomeo et al,2007;Thiebaut de Schotten et al,2005).  
Patients with neglect have different combinations of posterior 
cortical, frontal cortical, subcortical, and white matter damage 
and this is thought to underlie the diversity of functional 
deficits found in such people (Husain,2008).  Thus the neglect 
syndrome suggests that the connection between the IPC and 
frontal cortex is quite important in attention and the 
production of conscious experience, including emotion.   
 
POSITIVE FEEDBACK AND NONLINEAR EMERGENCE OF CONSCIOUS 
EXPERIENCES (INCLUDING EMOTIONS) 
 
Crick and Koch (2003) determined that conscious experience 
depends on neuronal coalitions spanning the posterior sensory 
cortices and the executive areas of the prefrontal cortex.  
Hudetz (Anesthesia:When the front fails to see the back,Talk at 
TASOC 2008 Conference) and Hudetz and coworkers (2006) found 
that anesthetic drugs produce unconsciousness by disrupting 
these long range anterior-posterior connections.  Laplant and 
coworkers (2005) demonstrated a reduction in frontal activation 
in anesthetized animals that was normally present in waking 
animals.  This “hypofrontality” is commonly produced by a number 
of anesthetics.  Laureys (Identifying the brain’s awareness 
system:Lessons from coma and related states,Lecture at TASOC 
2012 Conference;Demertzi et al,2013;Lapitskaya et al,2013) found 
that external sensory awareness is an emergent property 
dependent on cortical-cortical interconnections in a widespread 
frontal-parietal network.  Activity in this network was reduced 
during anesthesia, coma, unresponsive wakefulness syndrome 
(vegetative state), and minimally conscious states.  Imas and 
coworkers (2005) found recurrent feedback from anterior to 
posterior brain areas was suppressed earlier in anesthetized 
animals than feed forward information transfer.  Mashour 
(Consciousness in the operating room,Lecture at TASOC 2012 
Conference;Avidan et al,2011;Ku et al,2011;Lee et al,2009) found 
that anesthetics suppress mainly parietal cortex feedback 
connectivity, but not parietal cortex feed forward connectivity.  
This is reversed when the person awakes.  Mashour concludes that 
the parietal cortex is affected much more than frontal areas by 
anesthetics, that conscious experience is likely a cortical-
cortical feedback interaction, and that conscious experience may 
be governed by this feedback interaction.  A number of other 
investigations have found that feedback connectivity is required 
to generate conscious experience (Boehler et al,2008;Crick & 
Koch,1995;Fahrenfort et al,2007;Lamme & Roelfsema,2000;Ro et al, 
2003;Tononi & Koch,2008).  A positive feedback interaction 
between the prefrontal cortex and IPC appears to be involved in 
the production of conscious experience, including emotion.  
 
POSITIVE FEEDBACK, NONLINEAR EMERGENCE, AND ATTENTION 
 
Perception and focal attention are necessary for the production 
of conscious experience, including emotion (Rowlands,2002; 
Velmans,1999).  As discussed, the IPC is involved in perception.  
The frontal lobes, especially the right frontal lobe, and the 
parietal lobes have great attention capacity (Desmedt,1977; 
Dimond,1976,1979;Hielman & Van Den Abell,1979,1980;Joseph,1982, 
1986a,1988a,b;Tucker,1981).  Prinz (2003;Attention as the 
mechanism of consciousness,Lecture at TASOC 2012 Conference) 
found that awareness (conscious experience) does not arise 
without attention and develops over a time delay.  Prinz 
suggested this time delay may be the time necessary for 
attention to act.  Joseph (2000) and Prinz found that attention, 
perception, and working memory occur in the IPC.  Working memory 
also operates in the DLPFC (Fuster,1997,2000,2008;Goldman-Rakic, 
1990).  Working memory is the provisional retention of 
perceptual information for prospective action, a type of focal 
attention whereby perception is reorganized and rerepresented, 
becoming explicit, functional, and conscious (Luck & Vogel,1997; 
Todd & Marois,2004;Vogel & Machizawa,2004).  Working memory is a 
cognitive process that is accompanied by consciousness (Fuster, 
personal communication,2013).  Working memory represents the two 
components (perception, focal attention) necessary for the 
production of conscious experience and produces conscious 
experience.  Working memory may be formed and maintained by 
reentry (Fuster,1997;2008).  Reentry is a reciprocal interaction 
and occurs throughout the brain (Tonelli & Edelman,1998).  
Consciousness is impaired if the reentry mechanisms of the brain 
are disrupted (Tonelli & Edelman,1998).  Positive feedback is a 
type of reentry.  Positive feedback and nonlinear emergence in 
prefrontal-IPC connections also occurs over a time delay and 
results in conscious experience.  Positive feedback and 
nonlinear emergence in prefrontal-IPC connections then may be a 
type of working memory (focal attention) whereby perception is 
reorganized and rerepresented, becoming explicit, functional, 
and conscious.  The reorganization and rerepresentation of 
perception occurring in working memory is not entirely 
predictable and probably arises in a nonlinear fashion typical 
for complex systems like the brain (Gershenson & Heylighen, 
2004).  Positive feedback and nonlinear emergence in prefrontal-
IPC connections therefore may be a type of focal attention which 
produces conscious experience, including emotion.  Conscious 
experience (emotion) is in effect arising from focal attention 
and perception.  Any disruption in the positive feedback 
interaction between the prefrontal cortex and IPC would be 
tantamount to a disorder of attention and might produce neglect.   
 
PRODUCTION OF ADAPTIVE ACTION 
 
Working memory has been shown to operate in the DLPFC (Fuster, 
1997,2000,2008;Goldman-Rakic,1990).  Fuster (1997,2000,2008) 
found that the DLPFC mediates the ongoing production of 
voluntary new or novel intentional (adaptive) actions through 
the integration of three cognitive processes: active short-term 
memory (working memory), motor set (selection, preparation, and 
readiness for action), and the inhibition of excess activity 
(also part of attention).  Hence the explicit conscious states 
(conscious experiences, emotions) arising from positive feedback 
and nonlinear emergence (working memory, focal attention) may be 
utilized by the DLPFC for the preparation of voluntary new or 
novel intentional (adaptive) actions (and in other cognitive 
functions).  Such actions are thus mediated, deliberated, 
voluntary, and intentional.  Emotions are subjective; that is, 
emotions are developed by processes within the brain and are not 
directly caused by external sensory stimuli.  Subjective states 
like conscious experiences (including emotions) may be thought 
of as new internal points of view or perspective (internal 
contexts) built from previous experience (perception) and 
external input (Alter,2002;McClamrock,1992;McCrone,2001;Sieb, 
2011).  Adaptive actions (actions performed in response to 
changes in the environment, also called voluntary new or novel 
intentional actions) are always produced in relation to our 
point of view or perspective (subjective conscious state) at the 
time (Alter,2002;McClamrock,1992;McCrone,2001;Sieb,2011).  
Perception would directly produce only stereotyped, reflexive, 
or programmed-type actions (Gershension & Heylighen,2004).  In 
order to produce voluntary new or novel intentional (adaptive) 
actions, perception must be reorganized and rerepresented 
(Gershension & Heylighen,2004).  As just discussed, this may 
occur through positive feedback and nonlinear emergence in 
prefrontal-IPC long-range connections (working memory, focal 
attention).  The creation of explicit functional conscious 
states (emotions, other conscious experiences) allows us to 
respond to our constantly changing environment in a voluntary, 
rapid, new or novel, versatile, and purposeful manner; in other 
words, we respond to change by self-organizing our behavior 
(McCrone,2001;Sieb,2011).  We are not bound by stereotyped, 
inflexible, reflexive, or programmed-type responses, typical of 
animals and machines, but can create new or novel responses, as 
the situation demands (Sieb,2004,2007,2011).  Various degree, 
composition, and type of emotion may be created, depending on 
the situation.  Hence we have a high capacity to produce 
adaptive behavior based on our emotions.  Emotion may be 
especially important in the production of the adaptive behavior 
known as social behavior.  The ability to create a variety of 
emotions is necessary for successful social interaction and for 




Emotion is explicit, functional, and conscious.  It is the 
affective aspect of consciousness.  Emotion has all the same 
properties as conscious experience and is defined as conscious 
experience.  Emotion therefore is conscious experience.  Emotion 
is also produced in the same way as conscious experience.  Hence 
emotion is conscious per se.  Conscious experience, including 
emotion, represents the content of consciousness (what is in 
consciousness).  Emotion may have evolved for the production of 
adaptive behavior, especially social behavior.  
 
Emotions are complex reaction patterns arising to sensory 
stimulation and consist of three components: a physiological 
component, a behavioral component, and an experiential 
(conscious) component.  Emotions arise from processes within the 
brain and are not directly caused by external sensory stimuli 
(hence they are subjective).  The reactions making up an emotion 
determine what the emotion will be recognized as.   
 
Three processes are involved in producing emotion: (1) 
identification of the emotional significance of a sensory 
stimulus, (2) production of an affective state (emotion), and 
(3) regulation of the affective state.  Process (1) consists of 
the development of an affective value or valence (stimulus-
reinforcement association) for sensory stimulation.  Affective 
valence is developed through the relative activation of two 
opposing systems in the brain by sensory stimulation: the reward 
and punishment systems.  The development of affective valence 
begins early in sensory processing, long before the sensory 
stimulus is recognized cognitively and consciously in the 
cerebral cortex.  The development of affective valence is 
important as it regulates further stimulus processing 
(facilitating or inhibiting stimulus processing), regulates 
arousal, attention, and consciousness (through activation of the 
reticular activating system), and is the basis for the 
evaluative, expressive, and experiential aspects of emotion, 
conditioned emotion learning acquisition and expression (in the 
amygdala), memory consolidation (via the amygdala and 
hippocampus), reinforcement-expectancies for decision-making and 
coping responses (via the amygdala, OFC, and ACC), adaptive 
behavior (via the dorsal ACC and DLPFC), and social behavior 
(via the dorsal ACC, OFC, and DLPFC).  The effects of affective 
valence are relatively primitive or reflexive at subcortical 
levels but may be refined into emotional reactions at higher 
limbic and neocortical levels.  The reward system appears to 
produce its effects through the modulation of dopamine, 
acetycholine, noradrenaline, and serotonin neurotransmitter 
actions in the brain.  The punishment system appears to produce 
its effects via inhibitory limbic structures.  All emotions have 
an affective valence (are seen as positive or negative emotions) 
and appear to develop from affective valence.   
 
The amygdala is critical for the representation of stimulus-
reinforcement (affective valence) associations (both reward and 
punishment-based) needed for emotion processing and expression 
(process 2), positive and negative conditioned emotion learning 
acquisition and expression, memory consolidation, reinforcement-
expectancies for decision-making and coping responses, and 
social behavior.  Stimulus-reinforcement associations are passed 
from the amygdala to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (OFC, 
ventral ACC) for emotion expression and regulation, 
reinforcement-expectancy for decision making, and social 
behavior.  Increased amygdala activity due to emotional arousal 
increases the strength and retention of long-term memories via 
connection of the amygdala with the hippocampus and 
parahippocampus.  Amygdala projection to the ventral ACC is 
utilized for the automatic regulation of emotion.  The dorsal 
ACC suppresses the amygdala and may be involved in the cognitive 
regulation of emotion.  Differences in the size and connections 
of the amygdalae may account for some of the differences in 
emotion and social behavior seen in men and women.  People with 
larger amygdalae are better able to interpret emotions, have 
larger and more complex social networks, are better able to make 
social judgments, and may have better emotional intelligence 
than people with smaller amygdalae.   
 
The prefrontal cortex appears to be essential for the regulation 
of emotion (process 3).  The prefrontal cortex may be separated 
into three distinct and separate architectural and functional 
areas.  The DLPFC is known as the central executive for 
cognitive and intentional control.  It is the highest cortex for 
motor planning, preparation, and execution (voluntary new or 
novel intentional actions).  Explicit functional conscious 
states (including emotions) may participate in the preparation 
of cognitive functions and voluntary intentional (adaptive) 
actions (including social behavior and coping responses) by 
acting on the DLPFC.  The OFC is known as the central executive 
for emotion and social control.  The OFC is primary for the 
production of emotion, social behavior, and reinforcement-
expectancies for decision-making.  Affective valence information 
from the amygdala is essential for this function.  The ventral 
ACC may assess affective valence information from the amygdala 
for the automatic regulation of emotion and works with the OFC 
in the implementation of reinforcement-expectancies for 
decision-making.  The activity of the dorsal ACC is correlated 
with consciousness and appears to be involved in the cognitive 
regulation of emotion and motivation.           
 
A positive feedback interaction between the prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC, OFC, and ACC) and the IPC (perception) appears to give 
rise to the conscious experience of emotion.  Positive feedback 
and nonlinear emergence in prefrontal-IPC connections may 
represent a type of working memory or focal attention by which 
perception is reorganized and rerepresented, becoming explicit, 
functional, and conscious.  Explicit functional conscious states 
(including emotions) arising from this mechanism may be utilized 
for the preparation of cognitive functions (planning, reasoning, 
calculating, problem-solving, decision-making, logic, grammar, 
language comprehension and production), voluntary new or novel 
intentional (adaptive) actions, social behavior, and motivation.   
 
Emotion has an intimate relationship with social behavior.  
Disruption at any stage in the development of emotion (affective 
valence, regulation of attention and consciousness by the 
reticular activating system, amygdala, OFC, ACC, DLPFC, IPC, 
prefrontal-IPC connections) results in disordered social 
behavior.  Emotion appears to control social behavior (our 
emotions determine how we respond to others).  Study of the 
various structures and interconnections involved in the 
production of emotion is very important for the understanding, 
diagnosis, and treatment of various mood and emotional disorders 
and social dysfunctions.                   
 
Essentially, the whole brain is involved in the production of 
emotion.  Affective valence must be developed for sensory input 
via the reward and punishment systems.  The reticular activating 
system regulates the level of attention and consciousness.  
Affective valence is represented in the amygdala.  Affective 
valence information is passed from the amygdala to the 
prefrontal cortex.  Sensory input is integrated in the sensory 
areas of the cerebral cortex and converges for perception in the 
IPC.  A positive feedback interaction between the prefrontal 
cortex and the IPC results in the nonlinear emergence of an 
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